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FUTURE OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM? 
Ernest A. Young* 
It is humbling for an American scholar of federalism to admit that the most 
interesting developments in federalism are happening in Europe, not the 
United States. But this has been true for some time. Kicking off the European 
Union’s convention to draft a constitutional treaty in 2001, former French 
president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing compared the proceedings to “the famous 
convention of Philadelphia of 1787.”1 The comparison was apt, in that the 
fundamental relationship between Brussels and the EU’s Member States has 
been under renegotiation for much of the past decade and a half. Since the 
unsuccessful constitutional convention,2 the EU has seen the world’s most 
significant contemporary crisis of fiscal federalism,3 foundational 
disagreements between the European Court of Justice and the constitutional 
courts of the Member States over judicial supremacy,4 and the prospect of a 
real-live secession by a major Member State.5 
American federalism has often served as an instructive example for those 
developments—sometimes as a role model, perhaps more often as a 
cautionary tale.6 The general federalism literature on this side of the Atlantic, 
however, has paid relatively little attention to Europe. This inattention is both 
intellectually unsatisfying and, increasingly, practically dangerous. As the 
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European Union has slid into a series of crises over the euro, terrorism and 
refugees, and now Brexit, it has become increasingly urgent to understand 
what is going on over there and what it portends for our own federal system. 
In some instances, these crises may offer previews of coming attractions for 
America; we have, after all, our own debates over sovereign debt, 
immigration, and populist politics. In other respects, European structures and 
solutions may offer some options that Americans have previously failed to 
consider or appreciate. 
It is, alas, easier to see that Europe can teach us something important than 
to decipher what the actual lessons are. Comparative law has long encouraged 
a healthy skepticism about deriving “answers” to one country’s problems 
from another’s experience,7 and the crises rocking Europe are so complex 
that it will be decades before they are understood with any confidence. But 
all this counsels humility, not inattention. It is time to start talking about what 
the arc of European federalism can tell us about federalism in our own 
system. 
At the outset, one must acknowledge considerable debate as to whether 
the European Union is properly described as a federal system at all.8 In other 
work, I have focused on competing visions of the EU as “federal” and 
“intergovernmental” in nature.9 It seems best to begin here with capacious 
standard definitions. Political scientist Jenna Bednar, for example, classifies 
a government as federal if it meets structural criteria of “geopolitical 
division” (mutually exclusive territories are constitutionally recognized and 
may not be abolished by the central authority); “independence” (state and 
national governments have electorally or otherwise independent bases of 
authority); and “direct governance” (each level of government governs its 
citizens directly and is constitutionally sovereign in at least one policy 
realm).10 The EU is plainly a federal system under these sorts of criteria, even 
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if it may also be usefully analyzed as an international organization or some 
other sort of entity.11 The point is simply to suggest that comparisons to other 
federal systems may be useful—not to exclude other models. 
I want to focus on two sets of questions about European federalism, each 
of which has significant implications for America. The first involves the 
factors that limit centralization in Europe. Most observers seem to consider 
the EU to be a less centralized polity than the United States,12 yet the scope 
of the EU’s regulatory jurisdiction is equal to or greater than that of the 
American national government. Member State autonomy vis-à-vis Brussels 
owes much more the disparity in governmental capacity and resources 
between the Member States and the Union, as well as to the primary 
identification of Europeans with their Member States, than it does to any 
constitutive limitation on the Union’s powers. This suggests that the 
American literature’s focus on regulatory jurisdiction—the old problem of 
limited and enumerated powers—may be misplaced. American scholars need 
to pay a lot more attention to the structure and capacity of the institutions that 
enforce national law, as well as to the interaction of Americans’ dual 
identities as citizens of state and nation. 
The second set of questions arises from Europe’s recent travails. Over the 
past several years, the European Union has faced a wave of successive crises 
over the euro, terrorism, migration and refugees, and the rise of euro-
skepticism illustrated by the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote. Americans have 
viewed these developments with concern, but have not generally asked what 
they portend for American federalism. The euro crisis, however, illustrates 
the central importance of fiscal federalism—the relationship between the 
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taxing, spending, and borrowing authority of the center and the periphery. 
The American states (and Puerto Rico) face debt crises of their own, and these 
crises are already requiring the national government to reconsider the means 
by which it supports troubled states and territories.13 Likewise, intra-
European disagreements about how to regulate immigration and its 
differential impact on the Member States have echoes in American disputes 
over immigration policy between Washington, D.C. and the border states.14 
Finally, the Brexit vote and the parallel rise of Euroskeptic movements in 
France and other Member States reflects profound popular concerns about 
the legitimacy of governance at the center.15 Although the United States has 
not generally been thought to suffer from the same sort of “democratic 
deficit” that haunts European discourse, we are experiencing profound 
frustration with gridlocked and nonresponsive government in Washington, 
reflected in the precipitous decline in public trust in national governing 
institutions.16 We are unlikely to see a “Texit” (or perhaps more likely, a 
“Utexit” or “West Virgexit”) but it is nonetheless time to ask how the eroding 
legitimacy of national government may affect American federalism. 
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I. JURISDICTION, CAPACITY, AND IDENTITY 
American federalism debates have tended to focus on the scope of national 
regulatory jurisdiction. That was the issue in landmark Supreme Court 
decisions like United States v. Lopez17 and Gonzales v. Raich.18 It was also 
the question on which most people focused in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius,19 although I shall suggest it was not the 
most important part of that decision. American discussions of federalism 
have tended to equate what the national government can do with what it will 
do, and they have analyzed “can” in terms of constitutional jurisdiction rather 
than pragmatic capacity. They have assumed, moreover, that the states will 
retain only those functions that are constitutionally reserved to them under 
the Tenth Amendment. Certainly one can find important exceptions to these 
tendencies in the literature,20 but the general focus has remained on the scope 
of the national government’s constitutionally-enumerated powers and the 
corresponding enclaves that are reserved to the states. 
It is not hard to see why this focus arose or why it persists. Constitutional 
lawyers tend to gravitate toward the limits on governmental powers—
particularly those limits that courts may enforce. They tend to leave what 
government may choose to do within those limits to political scientists and 
public policy types. But constitutional law operates within this policy space 
as well, by framing many of the procedures by which decisions are made,21 
structuring the political accountability of those who make them,22 and 
affecting the resources available to carry them out.23 Neglecting these 
dynamics distorts our view of the role that constitutional law plays in our 
federal system. 
Looking to Europe helps clarify the centrality of these non-jurisdictional 
constitutional factors. Europe’s version of the enumerated powers doctrine is 
the principle of “conferral,” which holds that the EU may exercise only those 
powers conferred on it by its foundational treaties. Hence, Article 5 of the 
treaty establishing the European Community provided that “[t]he Community 
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shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and 
of the objectives assigned to it therein.”24 Robert Schütze has described this 
provision as “the European equivalent of the Tenth Amendment to the 
American Constitution.”25 
Although originally conceived in narrow terms,26 these conferred powers 
have become quite broad over time. This has occurred not only through the 
addition of new EU competences in successive treaties, but also through the 
expansive interpretation of the EU’s power over the internal market in Article 
100a and its implied powers in Article 235.27 These provisions have 
functioned effectively as a Commerce Clause and a Necessary and Proper 
Clause, respectively, with results that should surprise no one familiar with 
Wickard v. Filburn28 and McCulloch v. Maryland.29 Just as Congress’s power 
over interstate commerce came to be used for a variety of non-economic 
objectives, “[t]he Commission and the European Council . . . conceptualized 
the single market in a broader, more holistic, manner. Consumer welfare, 
social policy, and environmental policy were regarded as important facets of 
the internal market strategy.”30 More generally, a British Member of the 
European Parliament recently concluded that “[t]he EU now has exclusive 
competence in some, and a degree of competence in almost all, policy 
areas.”31 
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 30. Craig, supra note 27, at 20. 
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Much like the United States, then, the European Union has moved from a 
regime of “dual federalism,” predicated on sharp jurisdictional divisions 
between the central government and its subunits, to “cooperative federalism,” 
in which both levels of government share responsibility over most regulatory 
subjects.32 One would be hard pressed to come up with anything that the EU 
can’t regulate under the powers that the Treaties give to Brussels, as well as 
the broad implied powers jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. A 
somewhat notorious 2001 EU directive, for example, regulates the use of 
ladders in the workplace.33 Nonetheless, the EU is generally perceived to be 
far more decentralized than the U.S. Andrew Moravcsik has written, for 
example, that “[t]he EU remains, despite a few federal elements, essentially 
a confederation of nation-states: the most ambitious and successful among 
international organizations, rather than a federation aiming to replicate and 
supplant European nation-states.”34 
For American scholars this presents a puzzle. If Brussels and Washington 
enjoy largely equivalent regulatory jurisdiction, why does the EU remain so 
much less centralized than the United States? I think the answer actually has 
at least three distinct aspects. 
The first has to do with legal culture. Although the EU institutions, 
including the European Court of Justice as well as the Commission, have 
interpreted the Union’s conferred powers expansively, one still comes away 
with the sense that they have not been read as aggressively as they might have 
been on this side of the Atlantic. An American lawyer looks at, say, the treaty 
provisions allowing the EU to regulate in order to create and preserve an 
internal market among the Member States, and says “Bingo, it’s a Commerce 
Clause!” And we know that commerce can be anything, because everything 
                                                                                                                            
 32. See SCHÜTZE, supra note 25, at 346. On these different models of federalism, see, 
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 33. Directive 2001/45/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 
Amending Council Directive 89/655/EEC Concerning the Minimum Safety and Health 
Requirements for the Use of Work Equipment by Workers at Work, 2001 O.J. (L 195) 46. The 
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it “is the most appropriate means of achieving the desired objectives and does not go beyond what 
is necessary for that purpose.” Id.; see also Charles Wyplosz, Eur. Comm’n for Econ. & Fin. 
Affairs, The Centralization–Decentralization Issue, at 26 & n.18 (Sept. 26, 2015), 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/dp014_en_2.pdf (suggesting that such 
directives are “needless entrenchments on national sovereignty”). 
 34. Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 11, at 25. 
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affects it.35 Hence we end up with a Federal Government prosecuting 
robberies of local drug dealers and incarcerating sex offenders,36 all in the 
name of protecting interstate commerce. The American enumerated powers 
jurisprudence has deconstructed the phrase “commerce among the several 
states” to the point that it largely lacks meaning today.37 
My strong impression is that Europeans generally don’t think that way. 
They are not cursed by Legal Realism, or at least not to the same degree as 
American lawyers, and so when they read a textual provision purporting to 
grant a limited regulatory power, their first instinct is not to deconstruct the 
purported limits on that power and turn it into a blank check. The fact that 
EU powers may be expanded by new treaties—and that such treaties have 
proved fairly frequent—may also relieve the pressure for adventurous 
interpretation of existing provisions. Because the U.S. Constitution is 
functionally unamendable, after all, American lawyers have a strong 
incentive to find some basis for desired innovations in the original text. In 
any event, I submit that one reason that the EU’s powers are more limited in 
practice than Congress’s is that European lawyers aren’t as inclined to kick 
over the limits every time they want to legislate more broadly. 
But I think two other aspects of the puzzle are considerably more 
important. Both illustrate the relative importance of regulatory jurisdiction 
vis-à-vis other aspects of the federal balance. To begin, the EU is more 
decentralized than the United States because despite the breadth of the EU’s 
jurisdiction, its actual institutional capacity is far more limited in several 
respects: 
1. The EU’s capacity to make decisions independent of the Member 
States is far more limited than Congress’s; 
2. it has far less money to spend, and far less power to raise more, 
than does the American federal government; and  
                                                                                                                            
 35. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005) (holding that home-grown 
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U.S. 111, 130–33 (1942) (holding that on-farm wheat consumption sufficiently affects the 
interstate market for wheat). 
 36. See Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2081–82 (2016) (holding that in a 
prosecution under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, for robbery of a drug dealer, federal 
prosecutors need not show that the relevant drugs moved in or affected interstate commerce); 
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 149 (2010) (upholding federal civil commitment of 
sexually dangerous persons as necessary and proper to operation of a federal prison system, which 
is in turn necessary and proper to enforcement of Congress’s enumerated powers). 
 37. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1231, 1236 (1994) (“Of course, in this day and age, discussing the doctrine of enumerated 
powers is like discussing the redemption of Imperial Chinese bonds. There is now virtually no 
significant aspect of life that is not in some way regulated by the federal government.”). 
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3. it depends on Member States almost completely to implement 
European law. 
Take decision-making first. One may fairly debate the height of the 
institutional hurdles facing EU legislation,38 but the EU legislative process 
plainly incorporates a great deal more political constraint on central 
lawmaking that adversely affects the Member States than does its American 
analog.39 The EU Council—which retains a decisive role in approving EU 
legislation—does not simply represent the Member States; it is actually 
composed of Member State ministers or (when it meets as the Council of 
Europe) heads of state. And although the Council’s traditional unanimity 
requirement has largely eroded over time, the “qualified majority” voting 
procedure (as well as the EU’s norms favoring consensus decision-making) 
still affords considerable scope for minorities of states to block legislation 
they oppose.40 In any event, one need only have paid marginal attention to the 
development of recent European crises over the euro, terrorism, and 
migration to note that the political lead has been taken by leaders of the 
Member States, not the Community institutions.41 The EU institutions are not 
yet the problem-solvers of first resort when the going gets tough. And 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, not EU Council President Donald Tusk, 
remains the essential figure in EU politics. 
                                                                                                                            
 38. Compare, e.g., Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 11, at 34 (“Formally, 
[the European lawmaking process] makes everyday legislation in the EU as difficult to enact as a 
constitutional amendment in the USA.”), with Young, Comparative Perspective, supra note 9, at 
22–23 (noting that the EU legislates at a rate comparable to Congress and that its constitutive 
treaties are amended far more often than the U.S. Constitution). 
 39. See Young, Comparative Perspective, supra note 9, at 23. 
 40. See id. at 24–25; see also LUUK VAN MIDDELAAR, THE PASSAGE TO EUROPE: HOW A 
CONTINENT BECAME A UNION 41 (Liz Waters trans., 2013) (“[T]o this day most decisions—and 
certainly the more important—are taken on the basis of consensus between the member states.”). 
To put the situation in terms of American legislative procedure, the current state of EU legislation 
seems analogous not simply to a pre-Seventeenth Amendment U.S. Senate, in which the Senators 
are selected by the state legislatures, but rather one in which those legislatures also have an 
absolute right to instruct their Senators on particular votes and in which each Senator has a “blue 
slip”—like veto over not only nominees to office, as in this country, but much legislation. 
 41. See, e.g., Sergio Fabbrini, The European Council, Careful of the Elephant that Prowls 
Brussels, ITALY 24 (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.italy24.ilsole24ore.com/art/politics/2017-03-
10/the-european-council-careful-of-the-elephant-that-prowls-brussels-182601.php?uuid=AEPrc
kl (“To emerge from decision-making stall, leaders of the strongest national governments have 
taken unilateral action to manage challenges that threatened their internal consensus.”); Charles 
Grant, What is Wrong with the European Commission?, CTR. FOR EUR. REFORM (June 27, 2013), 
http://www.cer.eu/insights/what-wrong-european-commission (observing that “ the euro crisis 
has drawn the EU into taking increasingly political executive decisions”). 
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Perhaps even more important, “the EU does not (with a few exceptions) 
enjoy the power to coerce, administer, or tax.”42 Start with the money. The 
EU is, as Daniel Ziblatt notes, “fiscally speaking, a political pygmy; its actual 
budget is minuscule, and it is arguably the largest political unit in history 
without the power to raise debt for itself.”43 EU revenue comes predominantly 
from three sources: duties on imports, collected by the Member States and 
transferred to the EU; a share of the value-added tax collected by the Member 
States; and a levy on the gross national income of each Member State capped 
at slightly under 1.3 percent.44 The last of these—which is simply a transfer 
from Member State budgets to the central authority—now accounts for about 
sixty percent of EU revenue.45 In this, the EU looks much like America under 
the Articles of Confederation (although without the incessant failures by the 
American states to actually pay their contributions46). None of this yields a 
great deal of revenue, and even the duties and VAT components are not 
structured in such a way as to allow the EU much flexibility to pursue 
regulatory objectives through the tax code.47 
Given these modest revenues, the EU accounts for only about two percent 
of European public spending; the U.S. national government, on the other 
hand, collects roughly seventy percent of American tax revenue and accounts 
for over half of total public expenditure in the United States.48 Hence, “the 
EU is not anywhere near other federal states” in terms of fiscal muscle.49 
Much of the EU budget, moreover, goes to the common agricultural policy 
and transfers to developing regions; “[l]ittle room exists for discretionary 
                                                                                                                            
 42. Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 11, at 34. 
 43. Daniel Ziblatt, Between Centralization and Federalism in the European Union, in THE 
GLOBAL DEBT CRISIS: HAUNTING U.S. AND EUROPEAN FEDERALISM 113, 113 (Paul E. Peterson & 
Daniel Nadler eds., 2014); see also Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 11, at 35 
(“Redistributing wealth by taxation and spending is the preeminent activity of the modern state, 
yet the EU does little of this.”). 
 44. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMM’N, EUROPEAN UNION PUBLIC FINANCE 237 (4th ed. 2008), 
https://www.agora-parl.org/sites/default/files/EU%20public%20finance%20-%202009.pdf. 
 45. See id. at 238. 
 46. On the failure of the states to pay their “requisitions,” see CALVIN H. JOHNSON, 
RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 
43–45 (2005). 
 47. Compare, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 563 (2012) (holding 
that Congress could employ its taxing power to encourage individuals to purchase health 
insurance), with United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 27 (1953) (noting that the Court had 
upheld a wide variety of taxes with regulatory effects). 
 48. Wyplosz, supra note 33, at 8; Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 11, at 
35; see also PISANI-FERRY, supra note 3, at 153 (noting that Europe “is not equipped with a 
meaningful federal budget”). 
 49. Wyplosz, supra note 33, at 8. 
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spending by Brussels technocrats.”50 This minuscule budget has led some 
commentators to conclude that “the EU does not have the main attributes of 
a federal state.”51 
The lack of broad fiscal powers sharply constrains the sorts of policies that 
the EU can enact and, therefore, the functions that Brussels can “take over” 
from the Member States. As Giandomenico Majone has suggested, lack of 
fiscal authority effectively limits the EU to regulatory policies, as opposed to 
non-regulatory or benefits-based programs.52 The EU also lacks the means to 
play the counter-cyclical role of ratcheting up welfare spending in times of 
recession that central governments typically play in federal states.53 And these 
fiscal constraints deprive the EU institutions of a tool frequently used by 
Congress to regulate outside the scope of its enumerated authority, which is 
the ability to make large financial grants to state governments conditioned on 
the implementation of federal policies that Congress could not enact 
directly.54 Perhaps most important, the EU’s budgetary constraints leave few 
opportunities to win the loyalty of European citizens by providing essential 
benefits analogous to American programs like Social Security or Medicare.55 
These disparities in resources are, unsurprisingly, mirrored in 
administrative capacity. As Professor Moravcsik points out, “the notion of a 
European ‘superstate’ swarming with Brussels bureaucrats is a delusion (or a 
deception) of Euroskeptics.”56 The European Commission, the principal 
administrative arm of the EU, employed 32,666 people in 2013—which made 
it about half the size of the U.S. Social Security Administration and a slightly 
smaller employer than the City of Chicago.57 This lack of administrative 
                                                                                                                            
 50. Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 11, at 35; see also Wyplosz, supra 
note 33, at 8 (noting that “[l]ess than half of the Commission’s budget is used for collective 
spending, mostly the administrative costs of the EU institutions . . . . [T]he remaining is used for 
transfers, not for direct spending.”). 
 51. Wyplosz, supra note 33, at 8. 
 52. See Giandomenico Majone, The European Commission as Regulator, in REGULATING 
EUROPE 61, 61 (Jeremy Richardson ed., 1996); see also PISANI-FERRY, supra note 3, at 157 
(identifying difficulties in creating a larger budget for the euro zone or the EU as a whole). 
 53. Wyplosz, supra note 33, at 10. 
 54. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (upholding Congress’s 
requirement that states raise their minimum drinking age to twenty-one as a condition on receipt 
of a portion of federal highway funds). 
 55. Even in the area of farm policy, where most of the EU’s money goes, national payments 
still outstrip benefits to farmers from the EU. See Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra 
note 11, at 36. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Compare EUR. COMM’N, HR KEY FIGURES CARD: STAFF MEMBERS (2017), 
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/hr_key_figures_en.pdf, with RAHM EMMANUEL, CITY OF 
CHICAGO: 2013 BUDGET OVERVIEW 23 (2013), 
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capacity radically constrains the EU’s ability to enforce its own laws and 
administer its own programs. Outside certain key institutions like the 
European Central Bank or the Commission’s Competition Directorate, the 
overwhelming responsibility for enforcing EU law falls to the Member 
States.58 
A final centrifugal force in the EU is the strong tendency of Europeans to 
identify primarily with their national political communities.59 Europe has the 
opposite problem: Citizens strongly identify with their Member States—as 
Frenchmen, Germans, or Poles—but it is not clear they think of themselves 
as “Europeans.”60 Both the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties bow to this reality 
by stating explicitly that “[t]he Union shall respect the national identities of 
its Member States.”61 
The primary identification of European citizens with their Member 
States—as well as the far more democratic quality of governance at the 
Member State level than in Brussels—has meant that the Member States 
remain the primary font of governmental legitimacy within the EU. In the 
United States, by contrast, the national government has long drawn upon a 
well of legitimacy at least as deep as those of the States (although public 
opinion data showing radical declines in public trust for national institutions 
may be altering this picture62). Europeans’ primary identification with their 
Member States enhances political checks on the EU’s use of its conferred 
powers and likely goes a long way toward explaining why Brussels has not 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/obm/supp_info/2013%20Budget/2013Ove
rview.pdf (proposing 33,550 employees in 2013); SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL 
SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN 2.73 (2016), 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2016/supplement16.pdf (listing 65,873 
employees). 
 58. See Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 11, at 36. Professor Moravcsik 
also notes the EU’s general lack of coercive capacity: “It has no army, police and intelligence 
capacity, and a miniscule tax base, discretion on spending, and administration.” Id. at 35.  
 59. See, e.g., VAN MIDDELAAR, supra note 40, at 212–25 (noting the problem and discussing 
different historical strategies for overcoming it); Hartmut Kaelble, Identification with Europe and 
Politicization of the EU Since the 1980s, in EUROPEAN IDENTITY 193, 205–08 (Jeffrey T. Checkel 
& Peter J. Katzenstein eds., 2009) (collecting evidence). 
 60. See, e.g., Anthony D. Smith, National Identity and the Idea of European Unity, 68 INT’L 
AFF. 55, 58 (1992).  
 61. Treaty on European Union tit. I, art. F, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 326); see also Treaty 
of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community art. 4(2), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306); Leonard F. M. Besselink, National and 
Constitutional Identity Before and After Lisbon, 6 UTRECHT L. REV. 36, 40–44 (2010) (discussing 
these Lisbon treaty provisions).  
 62. See State Governments Viewed Favorably as Federal Rating Hits New Low, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/15/state-govermnents-viewed-
favorably-as-federal-rating-hits-new-low/.  
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been granted greater fiscal and bureaucratic resources.63 And as the Brexit 
vote and the rise of Euroskeptic populism on the Continent demonstrate, 
nationalist ties to the Member States can blossom into a significant threat to 
integration.64 
So what can Americans learn from all this? Most fundamentally, we 
should stop obsessing about the scope of regulatory jurisdiction. The point is 
not that jurisdiction is unimportant; surely a real constraint on the scope of 
congressional regulation would be a powerful limit on national power. But 
we have arguably never had such a constraint. In the early Republic, the 
Supreme Court never struck down a federal statute on the ground that it 
exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers. And while the political branches 
may have internalized some sort of jurisdictional constraint,65 they have 
tended to get over it when the national interest seemed to truly compel federal 
action. Likewise, even the Lochner-era Court was a highly inconsistent 
enforcer of jurisdictional limits on national power.66 And the Rehnquist 
Court’s “Federalist Revival,” which struck down national legislation on 
enumerated powers grounds in a few cases,67 did more to fuel the careers of 
young academics than to meaningfully limit Congress’s powers.68 What 
Europe teaches, however, is that meaningful federalism can flourish even in 
a regime where central regulatory jurisdiction is exceptionally broad. We 
should focus more on how this can be so. 
More particularly, we should think hard about representation, 
governmental capacity, and identity in our own system. The political 
safeguards of Member State autonomy work in Europe because the Member 
States’ representation is so direct.69 The EU Council represents the Member 
                                                                                                                            
 63. See, e.g., Wyplosz, supra note 33, at 8, 12. 
 64. See CLARKE, GOODWIN & WHITELEY, supra note 5, at 173 (citing English national 
identity as a contributing factor in the Brexit vote). It is unclear that this factor was as important 
as more specific concerns about immigration, however. See id. at 161. Moreover, national 
identities can cut in different directions; those identifying as Scottish tended to vote against 
Brexit. See id.  
 65. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 20, at 545. 
 66. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998) (demonstrating that the Lochner-era Court upheld many 
federal statutes against constitutional challenges on enumerated powers grounds).  
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (striking down the federal 
Violence Against Women Act as exceeding Congress’s commerce power); City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as 
exceeding Congress’s enforcement authority under the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (striking down the federal Gun Free School Zones Act as 
exceeding Congress’s commerce power).  
 68. Which is not to say that the (then) young academics are not eternally grateful. 
 69. See, e.g., Young, Member State Autonomy, supra note 6, at 1689.  
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States’ governing institutions, not simply people and interests in the Member 
States. The political safeguards of federalism in our own system are far more 
attenuated.70 At best, national politicians elected by particular states are only 
imperfectly responsive to the interests of state governments;71 at worst, they 
may view state politicians as rivals for political and financial support.72 
Perhaps the mistake of “political safeguards” scholarship in this country has 
been its focus on federal representatives—who are, after all, national 
officials—rather than on the important role that state officials play in 
implementing and enforcing federal law. 
American scholars are starting to wake up to what my friend Heather 
Gerken calls “the power of the servant”73—that is, the ability of state officials 
who implement federal law to shape the content and impact of that law, 
sometimes in ways that are quite different from what federal authorities 
intend. The EU experience puts an exclamation point on this line of research, 
because there the central authority is almost completely dependent on 
potentially “uncooperative federalists” to implement European law. It 
suggests that we ought to spend less time worrying about the scope of the 
Commerce Clause and more about how federal programs structure the role of 
state implementation. That would suggest, for example, that the most 
important federalism case in recent memory is not Lopez but Sebelius’s 
                                                                                                                            
 70. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of 
Commandeering, in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 213, 237 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 
2001) (noting that, in contrast to the EU, “neither the governments nor the legislatures of the 
several States in their corporate capacities are represented in the federal decision-making 
bodies”); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 223–24 (2000) (pointing out that in America, Members of Congress 
have no particular incentive to protect the prerogatives of state governments). Professor Kramer 
thought that political parties created an alternative set of safeguards, but that notion has come 
under serious criticism. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political 
Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 960–61 (2001); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John 
C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 
1471–89 (2000).  
 71. See Young, Member State Autonomy, supra note 6, at 1649. This has been true not only 
since the Seventeenth Amendment divested state legislatures of the power to select U.S. senators, 
but rather since the Founders declined to give states power to instruct or recall their national 
senators and representatives. See William H. Riker, The Senate and American Federalism, 49 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 452, 456 (1955). 
 72. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of 
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 112 (2001).  
 73. Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
33–37 (2010); see also JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT 
THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 168–212 (2009); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & 
Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009).  
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holding on the Medicaid expansion, which crucially gave state governments 
a choice about whether to implement federal programs.74 
European Member States have a credible power of the servant because, 
given the general lack of capacity in Brussels, they are in most cases the only 
game in town.75 (A recent study by Daniel Kelemen, however, suggests that 
Europeans are increasingly turning to courts, via American-style private 
rights of action, to enforce EU law when national executive actors drag their 
feet.76) American states have correspondingly less scope to be uncooperative 
federalists, however, because at least in principle the federal government can 
step in and enforce federal law directly whenever it likes.77 Limited resources 
and bureaucratic capacity constrain this option, but as noted Washington, 
D.C., is considerably better endowed in these respects than Brussels. And the 
national government’s vast financial resources—derived from its (legally) 
unconstrained ability to tax and borrow—allows Washington to offer the 
States deals they cannot refuse in a way that is largely unavailable to 
Brussels.78 
This comparison suggests that the American literature on uncooperative 
federalism ought to focus in more detail upon the constraints that prevent the 
national government from superseding state implementation of federal law. 
Those constraints are likely to vary significantly across different statutory 
regimes. And to the extent that the constraints are statutory, their efficacy 
may turn in significant part on the willingness of courts to enforce those 
constraints in the face of executive circumvention. Likewise, the states’ 
power of the servant may be avoided where private plaintiffs have federal 
rights of action to compel particular action under federal law.79 Although 
                                                                                                                            
 74. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 578–79 (2012); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also Ernest A. Young, A Research Agenda for Uncooperative 
Federalists, 48 TULSA L. REV. 427, 440–43 (2013) (discussing Sebelius and the importance of 
states’ option to refuse to participate in federal programs).  
 75. See Halberstam, supra note 70, at 238–39.  
 76. R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW AND 
REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011). 
 77. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. 
L. REV. 1183, 1201 (1995). The earliest example of national authorities stepping in to supersede 
state implementation that proved overly “uncooperative” involved the Fugitive Slave Act in the 
antebellum period. H. Robert Baker, The Fugitive Slave Clause and the Antebellum Constitution, 
30 LAW & HIST. REV. 1133, 1138–39 (2012). 
 78. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (recognizing Congress’s broad 
power to impose conditions on federal grants of funding to states). 
 79. In this regard, the Supreme Court’s recent cases curtailing private rights of action to 
enforce rights conferred under federal cooperative federalism regimes may play an important role 
in maintaining the autonomy of state officials’ enforcement discretion. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. 
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many of us concerned about preserving state autonomy have long viewed 
uncooperative federalism as an attractive substitute for Herbert Wechsler’s 
idealized “political safeguards of federalism,” it has always been difficult to 
pin down the extent to which this state-protective dynamic actually works in 
this country.80 The European experience suggests that the allocation of 
resources and implementation capacity is an appropriate starting point for that 
inquiry. 
Finally, American federalism scholars need to think considerably more 
deeply about identity. The fact that citizens of the EU still identify chiefly as 
Frenchmen, Spaniards, or Poles—not Europeans—continues to have 
enormous political consequences for the structure of European federalism. In 
the United States, we take virtually for granted that Americans identify quite 
strongly with the nation, and many have doubted whether they identify with 
their States as well.81 On this conventional view, we have only Americans—
not Vermonters, Californians, or North Carolinians.82 This “one nation” 
orthodoxy looks less plausible, however, in light of mounting evidence of 
polarization and fragmentation across the American political landscape. 
Other observers have acknowledged a division of loyalties within the 
American political community, but questioned whether it breaks down along 
state lines.83 
The basic question whether Americans identify with their states breaks 
down into a host of more specific issues, all of which deserve further 
investigation. Do the states represent distinct political communities that 
                                                                                                                            
v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002) (refusing to let private plaintiffs enforce rights under the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 80. For a first-rate attempt at an answer, see NUGENT, supra note 73, at 213–29. 
 81. Compare, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL 
IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 25 (2008) (assuming, without evidence, that they do not), 
with Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity, Distinctiveness, and Political 
Culture in the American Federal System 123 (Feb. 24, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Duke Law Scholarship Repository), 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3431/ (arguing that often Americans do 
identify with their states as well as with the nation). 
 82. We definitely still have Texans. See, e.g., WAYNE THORBURN, RED STATE: AN INSIDER’S 
STORY OF HOW THE GOP CAME TO DOMINATE TEXAS POLITICS 2 (2014) (observing that many 
people “think of themselves first and foremost as Texans”). 
 83. See, e.g., BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED 
AMERICA IS TEARING US APART 5–6 (2008) (arguing that identity breaks down neighborhood by 
neighborhood); COLIN WOODARD, AMERICAN NATIONS: A HISTORY OF THE ELEVEN RIVAL 
REGIONAL CULTURES OF NORTH AMERICA 2–3 (2011) (arguing for strong regional identities based 
on historical migration patterns). 
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meaningfully affect political beliefs?84 To what extent do personal 
attachments to states affect political behavior? And do attachments to states 
trade off with, or complement, loyalty to the nation? Few American legal 
scholars have taken these questions seriously, but they go to the basic 
sociological underpinnings of federalism. The European literature has long 
had a much better handle on these questions,85 and it is time Americans paid 
more attention to them. 
II. CRISES OF FINANCE, MIGRATION, AND DISTRUST 
This is a difficult historical moment to be writing about the European 
Union. It has always been difficult for outsiders to keep up; notwithstanding 
the requirement of unanimity to amend the Union’s foundational treaties, the 
Member States have proven remarkably willing to undertake major structural 
revisions at relatively frequent intervals. If a scholar thought that he 
understood the basic workings of the EU institutions in, say, 2002,86 he would 
on returning to the subject today find the landscape significantly reshaped by 
the Lisbon Treaty as well as the various agreements that have dealt with the 
euro crisis—not to mention the still-unresolved conflicts opened by the Brexit 
vote. 
Recent years, however, have been particularly tumultuous. The euro crisis 
exposed a basic contradiction between the fiscal and monetary arrangements 
of the EU’s fiscal federalism. Intertwined crises of migration and terrorism 
highlighted the Union’s difficulty in formulating responses to common 
problems. And rejection of the proposed constitutional treaty by French and 
Dutch voters in 2005, dramatically underscored by Britain’s Brexit vote and 
rise of Euroskeptic populism in many other Member States, signaled that the 
masses may not share elites’ enthusiasm for “ever closer union.”87 
                                                                                                                            
 84. See, e.g., ROBERT S. ERIKSON, GERALD C. WRIGHT & JOHN P. MCIVER, STATEHOUSE 
DEMOCRACY: PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY IN THE AMERICAN STATES 71 (1993) (finding, based 
on extensive public opinion data, that one’s state is a significant predictor of ideological and 
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 85. See, e.g., NEIL FLIGSTEIN, EUROCLASH: THE EU, EUROPEAN IDENTITY, AND THE FUTURE 
OF EUROPE 4–6 (2008); THOMAS RISSE, A COMMUNITY OF EUROPEANS? TRANSNATIONAL 
IDENTITIES AND PUBLIC SPHERES 4–8 (2010). 
 86. See, e.g., Young, Member State Autonomy, supra note 6, at 1735–37. 
 87. The election of Emmanuel Macron in France—more importantly, the defeat of populist 
Marine le Pen—has suggested to many that the populist wave has crested in Europe. That may 
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Each of these crises is, in critical respects, unique to Europe. But each also 
resonates with particular tensions that exist in American federalism as well. 
I want to suggest that each highlights a way in which conventional wisdom 
about American federalism may need to be re-thought. 
A. Fiscal Federalism and the Euro 
I suspect that most American constitutional lawyers are the sort of people 
who were attracted to law school on the understanding that there would be no 
math. As a result, much of the federalism literature in this country skirts the 
topic of fiscal federalism. But one lesson of comparative federalism studies 
generally—whether of Europe or Canada or Australia or Switzerland—is that 
it’s crucial to follow the money.88 Most fundamentally, the way a polity 
allocates taxing and spending authority may provide clues to more 
fundamental democratic dynamics. As Charles Wyplosz has pointed out, 
“[d]emocracy was born when elected bodies were given the final say on 
taxation and public spending. European citizens still consider fiscal policy as 
a key attribute of the State.”89 Hence, the fact that “fiscal policy [remains] 
wedded to national sovereignty” indicates that Europeans “consider that the 
State is fundamentally national.”90 Likewise, until Europeans “recognize the 
European Parliament as representing their interests, there is little scope for 
EU taxation.”91 
The EU’s euro crisis vividly illustrates a more complex set of fiscal 
federalism dynamics involving monetary policy, fiscal policy, and debt. It 
suggests that Americans should pay more attention to our own fiscal 
federalism arrangements before we find ourselves in a similar predicament. 
Europe’s crisis arose out of a basic asymmetry between the EU’s retention of 
fiscal authority at the Member State level (Member States decide how much 
they want to tax, spend, and borrow) and the centralization of monetary 
policy among the states that adopted the euro. States like Greece were able to 
borrow extensively because their credit was tied to more fiscally sound euro 
countries, then when the financial crisis hit and the debt came due, they were 
unable to adjust by pursuing traditional monetary policy remedies (like 
devaluation). Because the loans to Greece and other troubled economies were 
                                                                                                                            
 88. See, e.g., MCKAY, supra note 11, at 136 (concluding that “distributional issues are often 
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as intergovernmental fiscal relations”). 
 89. Wyplosz, supra note 33, at 8. 
 90. Id. 
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held by banks throughout Europe, a Greek default would have had serious 
systemic effects. In the end, the more healthy euro zone economies (along 
with the European central bank and the IMF) agreed basically to bail the 
Greeks out.92 
The literature on fiscal federalism suggests that there are basically two 
ways to organize the financial relationship between a central government and 
its subunits.93 In most federal systems, the center guarantees the debts of the 
subunits.94 These guarantees create a potential for moral hazard; subunits may 
spend and borrow willy nilly (and creditors will be willing to lend to them), 
knowing that the central government will make good their debts.95 In order to 
avoid that problem, most central governments retain control over fiscal policy 
by constraining the taxing, spending, and borrowing authority of subnational 
governments.96 The alternative viable arrangement is for the subunits to retain 
fiscal sovereignty over taxing, spending, and borrowing, while the central 
government ensures that the credit markets will discipline them by 
committing not to bail the subunits out in the event of a default.97 The trick, 
of course, is in making the no-bailout commitment credible. Where that effort 
succeeds, the costs of borrowing for each subunit—reflected in the interest 
rates it must pay on the bonds it issues—will vary according to the 
creditworthiness of each subnational government.98 
The United States has generally pursued the latter arrangement. Federal 
law imposes no general constraints on state taxing, spending, or borrowing. 
The national government has, however, generally refused to bail out state 
governments when all that autonomy gets them into trouble. Because the 
United States has no formal prohibition of bailouts, the credibility of the 
                                                                                                                            
 92. See, e.g., PISANI-FERRY, supra note 3, at 80; JOHAN VAN OVERTVELDT, THE END OF THE 
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 93. See, e.g., JONATHAN A. RODDEN, HAMILTON’S PARADOX: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF 
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 97. See Rodden, Market Discipline, supra note 96, at 128; Peterson & Nadler, supra note 
94, at 253–54.  
 98. See Rodden, Market Discipline, supra note 96, at 137 (collecting data on credit-default 
swaps on state debt obligations).  
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American “no bailout” commitment rests instead on historical practice.99 
Eight states defaulted in the 1840s, ten more in the late nineteenth century 
following Reconstruction, and Arkansas defaulted during the Depression.100 
Although there have been efforts to get the national government to intervene 
in each instance, those efforts have generally been unsuccessful.101 The 
current significant differences among bond yields and credit ratings for the 
various American states strongly suggest that financial markets continue to 
perceive the national government’s “no bailout” commitment as highly 
credible.102 
Germany—the leading federal system within the EU—has chosen a mixed 
model; the central government controls taxation by the Länder but not 
expenditures or borrowing, and bailouts are available but not automatic.103 
Because of the strong bailout expectation, the credit ratings of the various 
Länder do not vary according to actual creditworthiness of the particular 
Länder governments.104 But the EU itself purports to follow the American 
model of fiscal federalism. The Member States do their own taxing, spending, 
and borrowing, and Brussels does not formally guarantee their debts.105 
Indeed, the Treaty of Lisbon incorporated an explicit “no bailout” clause.106 
Nonetheless, financial markets appear to have treated the various Member 
States’ debts as if they were part of a fiscally-unitary federation.107 The no-
bailout commitment, in other words, was not taken seriously. 
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Nothing in these fiscal or monetary arrangements can be said to have 
caused the euro crisis. The trouble was that the various euro zone countries 
varied considerably in their vulnerability to the worldwide financial crisis that 
began in 2007, and the EU lacked the central stabilization mechanisms 
available to more centralized states.108 In particular, countries like Greece, 
Portugal, and Ireland—which generally had less competitive economies and 
more profligate public sectors—had been able to borrow at rates driven by 
the euro area’s stronger economies, like Germany. When the crisis came, 
these weaker economies suddenly found themselves in danger of defaulting 
on their debts. Because of their commitment to monetary union, these states 
lacked the ability to respond through monetary policy—a devaluation of the 
Greek drachma, for example.109 
As financial markets had correctly predicted, the euro arrangement made 
the EU’s no-bailout commitment difficult to keep.110 An actual debt default 
by a euro zone country would put pressure on that Member State to exit the 
euro so as to regain the monetary tools to respond to the crisis. Moreover, the 
integration of the euro zone economies meant that much of the Greek debt, 
as well as debt issued by other struggling Member States, was held by banks 
in Germany and other powerful EU countries.111 Under the circumstances, it 
is hardly surprising that the no-bailout pledge went by the boards.112 
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It is too early to tell how the euro crisis will ultimately play out.113 But one 
can already see the central question for American federalism. No-bailout 
commitments are absolutely central to the traditional theory of fiscal 
federalism, which posits that without them the central government would 
have to take over the fiscal policy of its subunits. Otherwise, the subunits 
have strong incentives to spend or borrow as much as they like, knowing that 
the center will come to their rescue if trouble arises.114 Consistent with this 
model, we see that the euro zone countries have agreed to a “Fiscal Compact” 
that requires those countries to balance their budgets.115 This is not quite the 
same as ceding Member State control over spending and borrowing, as those 
states still retain the ultimate political authority over these decisions. But the 
compact is meant to be legally enforceable, and in any event the direction of 
institutional movement is clear: The weakening of the central authority’s no-
bailout commitment leads to significant pressure to weaken the subunit’s 
fiscal autonomy.116 
This point is significant because the United States faces its own quiet crisis 
of fiscal federalism.117 State and local governments report upwards of 
$1 trillion dollars in unfunded pension liabilities.118 The most recent flare-up 
has occurred in Puerto Rico, which has announced its inability to pay its debt 
and sought relief from the national government.119 The resulting legislation 
provided no financial assistance, but it did protect the Commonwealth from 
creditor litigation for a limited period of time.120 Even this minimal federal 
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bailout was accompanied by appointment of a financial-oversight board that 
eliminated much of the Commonwealth’s financial autonomy.121 The new act 
is unlikely to provide a permanent solution to the Commonwealth’s woes, 
and any further assistance will likely come with still further restrictive strings 
attached. 
Nor is Puerto Rico necessarily unique; Illinois, for example, may not be 
far behind, and plenty of American states find themselves in precarious 
financial condition.122 Some scholars and policymakers have already begun 
thinking about what happens when a State of the Union finds itself in Puerto 
Rico’s predicament.123 The tradition of American fiscal federalism says that 
the national government must let the states default, resisting any temptation 
to bail them out. Recent government bailouts during the financial crisis, 
however, provide one reason to doubt this commitment. If major investment 
banks and automakers are “too big to fail,” then it is hard to see how the same 
could not be true of California or Illinois.124 More fundamentally, the euro-
area bailouts suggest that the institutional dynamics of modern federal 
systems may make no-bailout commitments increasingly difficult to keep. 
Most discussion of the euro-area bailouts has focused on the need to keep 
Member States like Greece from exiting the common currency and to contain 
systemic risks, such as a wave of bank failures in other parts of Europe. But 
one should also ask what would have happened to Union law in the wake of 
a general collapse or weakening of Greek public institutions. As already 
discussed, virtually all of EU law is implemented and enforced by the 
Member States. Given its dependence on the Member States to enforce 
European law, Brussels has to care about the health and solvency of those 
governments. They’re too helpful to fail. 
If I am right about Europe on this point, then we should also worry about 
the no-bailout commitment in the United States. After all, the federal 
government in this country depends on the states to enforce much of federal 
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law as well. Although the anti-commandeering doctrine precludes Congress 
from forcing the States to implement federal law, most federal regulatory and 
benefit schemes nowadays are cooperative federalism regimes where state 
officials play a critical role.125 State and federal regulation and benefit 
programs are now intertwined—and interdependent—in a way that they 
simply were not during earlier state default episodes. One thus wonders 
whether, in the contemporary era, Washington could really tell Illinois or 
California to “drop dead” if either state were about to default on its debt.126 
Several commentators have suggested that the American no-bailout 
pledge is already fading. Jonathan Rodden, for example, has noted that 
federal stimulus funding and Medicaid supplements amounted to “implicit 
bailouts” during the most recent recession.127 Perhaps the erosion of the no-
bailout commitment is not overly threatening, given that other institutional 
mechanisms—such as the balanced budget requirement in nearly every state 
constitution—restrain state fiscal policy. On the other hand, financial markets 
still appear to take the no-bailout commitment more seriously than may be 
warranted; once it is perceived to have eroded, then one can expect the 
financial costs of profligate state borrowing to decline as state credit ratings 
come to be a function of national credit rather than actual state behavior. In 
other words, the current state of affairs may not be stable and the future is 
uncertain. 
The EU experience can provide few guideposts indicating where 
American fiscal federalism should go from here. The point, however, is 
simply that in Europe the financial issues driving constitutional structure have 
been more publicly salient than they have been in this country since the 
Founding era. American federalism scholars and policymakers should not 
wait for a true fiscal federalism crisis to pay more attention to money. 
                                                                                                                            
 125. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative 
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 668–72 (2001). 
 126. See Johnson & Young, supra note 117, at 147–48 (questioning the strength of the no-
bailout commitment). President Gerald Ford was famously reported to have told New York City 
to “drop dead” in 1975 in response to requests for federal aid. See Frank Van Riper, Ford to City: 
Drop Dead in 1975, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/president-ford-announces-won-bailout-nyc-1975-article-1.2405985 (originally published 
on Oct. 30, 1975). It turns out that President Ford never actually said “drop dead,” and in fact he 
signed legislation approving federal loans to the city two months later. See Sam Roberts, Infamous 
‘Drop Dead’ Was Never Said by Ford, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/28/nyregion/28veto.html. The moral is not simply to take 
things one reads in the paper with a grain of salt, but that “no bailout” commitments are difficult 
to maintain no matter how emphatically expressed. 
 127. Rodden, Market Discipline, supra note 96, at 135. 
 
49:1109] EUROPE AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM 1133 
 
B. Migration, Immigration, and Terrorism 
As if the euro were not enough, 2015 saw the EU reeling under two 
additional and related crises. An “unprecedented” number of refugees from 
Syria, Libya, Iraq, sub-Saharan Africa, and other places flooded into Europe 
in 2015, “more than in any previous European refugee crisis since World War 
II.”128 Through the first nine months of the year, over 800,000 people claimed 
asylum in the EU.129 The influx impacted some Member States considerably 
more than others, and individual states varied widely in their willingness to 
accept the migrants.130 Immigration was already a sensitive issue in Europe, 
with right-leaning anti-immigration policies making remarkable gains in 
recent years. It is thus unsurprising that the refugee crisis has produced vocal 
disagreements both within and among the EU’s Member States, or that the 
EU’s central institutions have commenced legal action to enforce various 
Member States’ obligations in relation to the influx.131   
Responding to the migrant crisis became considerably more difficult in 
November, when Islamic terrorists killed 130 people in Paris.132 
Unsurprisingly, the attacks seemed to spur opposition across Europe to 
accepting more migrants, especially in light of concerns that some potential 
terrorists may be among the many thousands of Middle Eastern refugees.133 
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Moreover, the terrorist threat has brought pressure to revisit the Schengen 
Agreement, which abolished border controls among twenty-six European 
countries.134 Reinstituting permanent border controls, of course, would be a 
highly-visible marker making Europe more like an intergovernmental 
federation and less like a federal state. 
Although the United States has not experienced a recent influx of migrants 
comparable to that in Europe, immigration has become particularly salient 
politically and legally in recent years. Although political debate has focused 
on national policy, that debate has spilled over into the courts as a question 
of federalism. That is because, as in Europe, opinion on immigration policy 
tends to be unevenly distributed geographically, and particular states have 
taken the lead in proposing a more rigorous enforcement policy. That, in turn, 
has brought those states into political and legal conflict with the national 
government. In particular, Arizona has sought to pursue a more rigorous 
enforcement strategy than that preferred by the Obama administration, and 
Texas has challenged the administration’s efforts to relax immigration 
restrictions by executive action.135 Although the latter dispute centers upon a 
question of national separation of powers, it became a federalism issue as 
well when the administration challenged Texas’s standing, as a state 
government, to participate in litigation over the legality of federal policy. The 
Supreme Court upheld Arizona’s effort to crack down on employers of 
undocumented aliens but largely struck down its efforts to ramp up criminal 
enforcement against the undocumented aliens themselves.136 In the Texas 
litigation, an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision enjoining the administration’s policy.137 
Again, it is too early to tell how the EU’s migration policy, such as it is, 
will play out. But two aspects of the European experience are worth 
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considering in relation to American debates about immigration. First, 
migration policy is asymmetrical in Europe; many Member States have 
signed onto the Schengen Agreement, which abolished border controls 
among signatory nations, but several others have not. The EU has thus 
functioned as a federal system for some time without a uniform policy on 
migration. This reality undermines the assumption, pervasive in critiques of 
state governments’ efforts to pursue policies that impact immigration, that 
such policies must necessarily be uniform throughout the United States. 
A second, more technical point is that in Europe Member States are 
generally accepted as appropriate litigants to challenge the lawfulness of EU 
policy. The Fiscal Compact among euro zone countries, moreover, even 
confers rights on signatory states to challenge the budgets of other states in 
court if they violate the compact. The linchpin of the Obama administration’s 
position in the Texas immigration litigation (as well as in the healthcare 
litigation before that) has been that American state governments lack standing 
to participate in such litigation. The argument has been that inter-institutional 
litigation of this kind involves essentially political disputes that belong in the 
political process rather than in courts.138 European inter-institutional litigation 
demonstrates that this need not be the case, and that courts can often 
effectively resolve legal disputes among the constituent units of a federal 
system. 
The most striking aspect of the EU’s migration and terrorism crises, of 
course, has been these crises’ effect in fueling the rise of populist euro-
skepticism and undermining trust in EU institutions. I turn to that dynamic in 
the next section. 
C. Crises of Legitimacy and Trust 
The Treaty of Rome—and most subsequent EU treaties—commit the 
signatories to an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.”139 From 
the general statements of EU politicians to the interpretive baselines set by 
the European Court of Justice, the teleology of inexorable integration has 
been a prominent feature of EU discourse for decades. Yet that feeling of 
inevitability seems a distant memory in the wake of the United Kingdom’s 
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vote to leave the Union on June 23, 2016. The Brexit vote reflects—and is 
likely to stimulate—euro-skeptic tendencies across the EU.140 Public opinion 
polling on trust in the EU had already hit an all-time low in 2013.141 Even 
before the Brexit vote, “[a]n economic crisis, record unemployment and five 
euro zone bailouts have taken their toll on the standing of the European Union 
that . . . is increasingly viewed as an overbearing, cumbersome 
bureaucracy.”142 
Part of the problem is that, for decades, the EU has gotten by largely on 
“output legitimacy”—that is, its remarkable record of delivering peace and 
economic prosperity has caused many to overlook fundamental concerns 
about the “democratic deficit” of its governing institutions.143 The euro crisis 
(and the serious austerity measures imposed in some countries to remedy it) 
called the Union’s ability to ensure prosperity into serious question, and the 
migration and terrorism crises made the EU institutions seem ineffectual in 
the face of external threats. With confidence in its outputs in tatters, the EU 
found itself with little democratic legitimacy to fall back on. 
We might compare this crisis of public confidence to recent developments 
in the United States. Here, too, survey after survey confirms that trust in 
public institutions is in decline. It is relatively commonplace to liken the rise 
of populist euro-skepticism in Europe to the anti-government anger that 
fueled Donald Trump’s candidacy in this country.144 Most of these analyses 
focus on nationalism, xenophobia, anti-elitism, and the like. It is less common 
to think of these developments in more institutional and structural terms. 
To begin, it may help to view the decline in trust in American government 
through the lens of input and output legitimacy. Academic lawyers have 
labored for decades to come up with an input-based theory of legitimacy for 
the administrative state, stressing the participatory procedures of the agency 
process, for example, or the links between agency decision making and the 
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democratically-accountable Congress and/or President.145 But however much 
these accounts impress other academics, one suspects that the real staying 
power of the American national administrative state is the sense that we 
cannot do without it. Its public legitimacy rests not on its attenuated ties to 
democratic theory, but rather—much as in the EU—on a democratically-
challenged institution’s ability to deliver prosperity and security. And also as 
in Europe, those Americans who feel the administrative state no longer 
delivers those public goods are much more likely to question its legitimacy 
as a matter of democratic principle. 
The much-neglected point, however, is that in both Europe and the United 
States the decline of trust in government has a critical federalism dimension. 
One can debate the relative weights of xenophobia and good old-fashioned 
nationalism in motivating the Brexit vote and populist euro-skepticism in 
other European countries.146 What is clear is that Brexit was a vote to shift 
power to a smaller geographical unit that its proponents viewed as closer to 
the people. It was, in other words, a choice to put trust in Westminster rather 
than Brussels.147 
Similarly, in this country, the precipitous decline in trust for national 
public institutions contrasts with increasing public trust in state and local 
government. One summary of the public opinion research concludes that  
[c]itizens on average evaluate the performance of the federal 
government as significantly lower than that of the state and local 
governments, report less faith in the federal government to ‘do the 
right thing,’ have significantly lower confidence in the ability of the 
federal government to solve problems effectively, see the federal 
government as significantly less responsive than lower levels of 
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government, and nearly 60 percent see the federal government as 
the most corrupt level of government.148  
Americans have lost faith in the federal government much more than they 
have lost faith in government generally. 
It is not hard to see why this should be so. In the early twentieth century—
especially during the New Deal—the national government enjoyed a massive 
trust advantage over the states. That was reflected in significant institution-
building at the national level and the increasing primacy of national politics. 
The public entrusted national authorities with expanded power because it 
perceived the states as institutionally incompetent to deal with economic 
dislocation, environmental degradation, and other critical problems. And for 
the most part, in this period, the national government did not disappoint. But 
national politics in the first part of the twenty-first century presents an 
unedifying spectacle of partisan gridlock, bureaucratic incompetence, 
financial irresponsibility, and lackluster results in addressing national 
problems. 
Meanwhile, state governments have largely avoided similar degrees of 
partisan paralysis while considerably upgrading their institutional capacity. 
Although the number of states with divided government fluctuates, it has 
generally declined in recent years; as of October 2016, thirty states enjoyed 
unified partisan control of both houses of the legislature and the 
governorship.149 And the literature on state governance tends to conclude that 
“states have vastly improved their capacity for dealing with problems” by 
building the institutional capacity of legislatures, executive branches, and 
state bureaucracies.150 
My point is not that Brexit should reopen the nineteenth century debate on 
American secession. It is, rather, that the EU probably undermined the 
legitimacy of its federal union by seeking more uniformity than its publics 
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were ultimately willing to support. We run the same danger in this country. 
Our national politics is so nasty in part because the stakes are so high; control 
of the national government, even by the narrowest of margins, allows one or 
the other faction to impose its worldview on huge swaths of the country that 
fundamentally disagree. It is not hard to imagine, however, a de-escalation 
by returning some of these divisive issues to jurisdictions where they can be 
resolved to the satisfaction of a higher proportion of a smaller electorate, with 
exit rights preserved for those who cannot live with the result. 
It may, in other words, be time to reassess the allocation of responsibility 
between the national government and the states—much as state governmental 
failure caused us to reassess an earlier allocation in the twentieth century. 
However it ultimately plays out, Europe’s crisis of governance demonstrates 
that there is nothing inevitable about “ever closer union”; no iron law of 
history requires consolidating more and more power in centralized 
institutions. Indeed, one fairly likely scenario is that the EU will survive and 
prosper by trying to do somewhat less. That would be a valuable lesson for 
American federalism. 
CONCLUSION 
One should not take all this talk of crises too much to heart. I tell my 
students each year that if one wants to know whether the EU is a success one 
need ask only one question: “Has Germany invaded France?” More 
generally, the map of the present-day EU reflects the healing of Europe’s 
twentieth century division; Europe’s economy, democracy, and civil liberties 
continue to remain—as they have for much of the past half-century—the 
envy of much of the world. Although historian Brendan Simmons is right to 
say that we have entered “a period of exceptional European uncertainty,”151 
suggestions that the EU’s “failure” is imminent are surely premature. 
Both the EU’s successes and its dilemmas can help us think about 
American federalism. I have tried to suggest here that the primary value of 
looking to Europe is to help us question our domestic assumptions. European 
federalism demonstrates that—contrary to much of the American literature—
the scope of regulatory jurisdiction may not be the best measure of a federal 
balance. The euro crisis highlights the importance of fiscal federalism, and 
the European debate about migration questions the inevitability of centralized 
control. Finally, the EU’s recent setbacks remind us that centralization is not 
inexorable, and that central power should take care in overreaching the 
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bounds of national consensus. In all these areas, the point is not to copy or 
avoid particular actions or arrangements pursued by the other governmental 
system. Comparative law works best, rather, when it simply helps us figure 
out what questions to ask. 
 
